How Civilians Survive Violence: A Preliminary Inventory



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Note to the Reader

There will always be mass violence. There will always be horrific times when we "outsiders" cannot shield civilians despite our avowed responsibility to protect them. Millions died amid internal conflicts in the last 15 years, and there is absolutely no guarantee that the next 15 years will be any better. That is the starting point of this paper: *our* capacity to protect is very much in doubt. Even when we do "save" civilians it is very often only because they saved themselves first—surviving violence by their wits and wiles for months or years, and then running a deadly gauntlet to reach our camps or safe havens.

Many observers note the critical importance of civilian self-protection, but it appears there have been very few systematic attempts to inventory their tactics and strategies. By and large we appreciate civilians' capacity for self-preservation or "resilience" but scarcely act upon it. This *preliminary* inventory cites protections that civilians the world over have learned time and again as they survive and serve others alone amid violence. Some types of actions cited here have alone saved millions of lives.

This document has three sections: local safety, local sustenance, and local services. Life-critical *sustenance* and *services* are an inseparable part of this because civilians often see them as central to their security, often take physical risks to obtain them, and often die in far greater numbers from the collapse of such elemental things than from direct physical violence. The biggest killers amid conflict are not guns or blades but malnutrition and disease—which at times can be anticipated and prepared for.

Each section begins with conventional local efforts to *engage* dangerous actors and *influence* events. These good efforts have limits "". (In 2009, the ICRC interviewed four thousand people in eight war-torn countries. When asked what civilians living in areas of armed conflict need the most, only 3% chose "to influence decisions that affect them." Each section then progresses toward the less conventional actions civilians attempt. These are efforts to survive the actors and events that they cannot influence. These too have limits—but tend to be deliberate, balanced, sequenced calculations by the people themselves.

Many of these actions have at times received ad-hoc backing by outside agencies, and many others could be supported by outsiders under certain circumstances. (This is the topic of another Cuny Center paper, *Preparedness Support*, depicting how qualified aid agencies can in some situations help brace local staff, partners, and beneficiaries for violence while working under the gun.) *This document does not urge the support of any particular action; as an inventory it only illustrates what civilians at times do.* Self-protection is not a panacea, nor is it easy to support. Yet of all protections, those for physical safety as well as life-critical sustenance and services depicted here will be the last ones standing because they rely on the abilities of the very people who are left standing alone as violence shuts the world out.

This inventory is not comprehensive—and the reader is invited to contribute to it. The taxonomy used here is just one of many plausible ways to organize the discussion. Much here could be debated and rearranged, but the big picture is this: we often lack the capacity to protect, they often learn this capacity on their own, and we can at times help them with this lethal learning curve.

How Civilians Survive Violence

PHYSICAL SAFETY

${f Accommodation}^\dagger$

Formal engagement

Influence violent powers and events through organized focus on

Good governance, rule of law, human rights, autonomy, etc. Conflict mediation, negotiation, reconciliation, prevention, etc. Complaint, lobbying, advocacy, media, etc.

Protest, nonviolent action

Open opposition as long as possible

When open opposition too dangerous and accommodation not deemed possible then:



- Transition underground: political struggle
- Transition underground: political and armed struggle
- Transition back: very common to continue probing for reengagement and a formal end to violence

Formal engagement can involve civil society activism, appeal to duty-bearers, forms of dialogue and expression, etc.

Locally based early warning at times trigger such engagement.



Engaging may ultimately prove ineffective or too dangerous.

Disengaging, going underground (whether armed or not) can be a fundamental act of protection, but carries obvious risks.

Traditional engagement

Customary processes for justice and peace

Custom law

Traditional and/or non-state authorities and arbiters of law

Traditional processes for redress, restitution, intergroup mediation, etc. This spills over into many social norms (like public shunning as sanction or deterrent), religious rites (for reconciliation that ends blood feuds or for forgiveness that brings those with blood on their hands back into the community fold), etc.

[For traditional or non-formal *policing* see section on "Skills and tactics by which communities avoid violence"]

Non-formal engagement

Persuade threatening powers that populace is compliant $^{\Diamond}$

Comply with demands for intelligence, manpower and material, etc. Bend to the breaking point

Do not overtly organize, speak out or act out

If compliance becomes too harmful to oneself or endangers others, locals often fake or exaggerate their cooperation:

Delay, deceit, misreporting, underperforming, selective obedience, etc.

Find ways to flatter power's vanity; tout "party line"

Persuade threatening powers that one is helpful or harmless

Offer intelligence of limited use (facts a bit obvious, outdated, etc.)

Millions survive by managing unequal power relations in nonformal ways, probing for tradeoffs and for exemptions to violence and oppression.

♦ This means compliance in the pragmatic, not partisan, sense. Civilians try to keep concessions survivable while preserving some autonomy and dignity. Family and village-level efforts to engage power-holders tend to be non-formal and localized, far below more official domains in

Accommodation here means an effort, ranging from engagement to appeasement, to contain dangerous situations and improve physical safety.

Find ways to make yourself valuable or indispensable to your abusers Feign passivity or stupidity

Persuade threatening powers that one is simply human

Find ways to offset the messages of dehumanization that often facilitate atrocities

Use cultural, literary, societal, or faith-based references to belie propaganda about an ethnic or gender group

Use face-to-face encounters to belie propaganda about an ethnic or gender group

Use children to convey images/messages of humanity
Use former fighters who eschew the propaganda as interlocutors

Present threatening powers with a false identity

Fake identity documents; alter accent, attire, mannerisms, etc.



which governments and civil society "engage" each other. They may have little to do with civic processes between citizens and duty-bearers redressing grievances within the rule of law. Instead, they occur between unequal parties, with the weaker calculating which concessions are the least harmful.

Feigned (partial) submission is often seen as a way of being at once compliant *and* defiant.

At the breaking point, locals often disengage from and avoid abusive powers.

Outsiders promoting civil society or nonviolent action might urge locals to "speak truth to power", not fully recognizing the dangers of continued engagement.

Persuade followers to remain nonaligned and peaceful

Leaders engage those in populace most at risk of being cowed, incited, attracted, or feeling no choice but to "take sides in a conflict"

Counter belligerent fear or hate propaganda, slanderous myths, etc. Dampen ardor of young males about real nature of war and warriors; demobilized fighters have proven effective in this regard Provide young males outlets (both real and symbolic) for a sense of duty, manhood, respect, honor that might be luring them to violence Address *safety* and life-critical *sustenance* and *services* so as to reduce the push/pull forces that can lead to desperate enlistment, premature flight, or preemptive attacks on others

Declare peace community, disallow personal weapons, etc. Make an exaggerated show of self-policing

Such self-policing requires social mobilization—communication of persuasive information—to reinforce a community identity against violence.

Psychological and material forces stoking conscription can at times be reduced. This is conflict management where people live, work and sleep.

Nonalignment or nonviolence may prove unrealistic or even dangerous.

Cut deals with threatening powers, most often for

Recognition of neutrality / inviolability of a designated site or sanctuary (a peace community or zone, hospital, church, etc.)

Separation of combatants from civilians

Reprieve from conscription

Time-limited reprieve to get inoculations, evacuate specified vulnerable groups, etc.

Waiver of "taxes"

Freedom of movement

Note: Civilians might assure this deal-making with a payment



Dominant powers and social blocs are not monolithic. Persecuted civilians often find useful ties to well-placed moderates, sympathizers (or pragmatic opportunists). This creates opportunities to eke out "humanitarian space".

Such engagement poses risks. At times, a "good deal" is not being killed in return for cash, food, conscripts and intelligence. This lends more fuel to the conflict.

Avoidance

Mobilization and preparation

Mobilization (requires a mindset)

Trusted influentials who know what motivates a populace's attitudes and behaviors turn peoples' thinking toward more vigilance and planning

Millions save their lives by physically avoiding violence. Their tactics and strategies become safer and more effective with increased experience. "Go & see" visits to, or "come & tell" survivor testimonials from, adjacent areas of conflict provide proof or persuasion of certain protection risks or opportunities

"Bamboo telegraphs" (local systems of gathering news the world over) provide convincement of the need (or not) to mobilize

Culture, experience, and trusted influentials may combine to persuade civilians that they have the cultivable capacities to survive

It is *abnormal* for people to plan their own displacement, especially if habit, instinct and simple cues fail to detect that violence has reached a dangerous new threshold. For this reason, mental readiness is as vital as tactical preparedness. Credible leaders and facts can alter a mindset of complacency or denial and clear the way for serious planning. Chance favors the prepared mind.

Whether civilians respond to danger by staying or going;

whether they react at a

community, household or

monsoons, raids or rains-

individual level; whether in response to machetes or

consistently seem to apply.

Preparedness is largely about shortening the deadly learning

preparation always matters and certain strategies and tactics

Preparation (requires a skill set)

Certain crisis skill sets are continually reinvented across cultures and epochs. Here is an incomplete and imperfect listing:

Information

Communication

Safe sites

Safe movement

Threat response

• These skill sets comprise hundreds of **optional** tactics. They also are the building blocks of strategies like non-formal policing, warning and flight. Though not the focus of this document, such skill sets also undergird civilian efforts in analogous situations, whether that of civil society brutally forced underground, or communities learning skills and making plans in advance of natural disaster. All these efforts reveal civilian inclinations and mastery in the face of deadly threats.



Many of the <u>optional</u> tactics listed below entail risk. On a case-by-case basis, people must determine the greater risk: getting systematically prepared for violence—or not?

Skills and tactics by which communities avoid violence

Information

Information gathering

Radio: public service broadcasts

Incident bulletins warning of areas to avoid; moderates urging calm, dispelling rumors, etc.; lost persons tracing hour; skits on situational awareness; commentary on the purpose of aid or peacekeeping missions; features on preparing ORS treatment, food security tips, contents of a flight kit; etc.

Other mass media (print, cassettes, video) from leaders conveying calm or solidarity or instructions, etc., if advisable

Discreet word-of-mouth networks

Classic grapevine or "bamboo telegraph"

Paid informants

Family member in armed group learns about its intentions and strategies, impending operations, death lists, etc.

Travelers' networks, especially merchants

Discreet observation

Monitor belligerents' preparations, movements, placement of landmines, etc.)

"Go & see" visits; "come & tell" survivor testimonials.

Tapping groups with extraterritorial scope and mobility (national NGOs, INGOs, missionaries, etc.).

Nothing is more essential to civilians amid violence than timely and accurate information. With it they may be forewarned of violence. They get life-saving advice, whether to quickly act or stay calmly in place. They learn of economic opportunity (labor, barter, lending, remittance). Information brought to those who are "cut off" brings comfort. It gets word of their suffering to the outside world. It enables the coordination required for what is often the safest asymmetrical response to violence: dispersed networks.

Public service broadcasts can have limits and risks. Stations can be shut down; staff harmed. Seemingly benign messages on political/military situations can have unintended consequences. Word of a distribution can lead predators to their prey. Content Commercially available radio scanners

Public domain satellite imagery (like Google Earth) confirm damage to infrastructure, aid route planning, etc.

Short and long-range patrolling or scouting.

Track or spoor recognition

Information assessment

Awareness of *priority* threat indicators

Shifts in military behavior—changes in command, strength, and morale; alterations in patrol; movement of fresh equipment and supply; unusual intelligence activity; increases in garrison size, upgrading of roads or extension of outposts; laying more mines, etc. Shifts in political behavior—many indicators, but most often: rise of powers with dangerous backgrounds, passage of restrictive laws, vilification of supposed "enemies", clamp down on media and civil society, etc.

Cross-verify reports from varied sources

Access first-hand accounts deemed reliable from conflict areas Access sources of news deemed reliable for interpretation of events

Information protection

Compartmentalization and need-to-know protocols

Simple codes and other ways to reduce eavesdropping

Cover stories

Avoid infiltration

Protocols to evaluate or interdict transients or newcomers
Passwords to determine "friend or foe" when encountering others
If informants spy due to intimidation or desperate need, then
consider if the threats they face can be lowered
Populations segmented into close-knit groups are well-suited to
detect attempted infiltration

Disinformation

Deterrent rumors of powerful patronage, rampant STDs, etc.

Alternated time and/or place of market, school, and worship activities Fake documents, misleading communiqués, bogus landmine markers, false trail signs, cookfires simulate encampments (draw attention away), and other ruses to keep civilians out of harm's way

False impression that properties are abandoned, pillaged or uninhabitable

Communication

Paths of communication

<u>Lines</u>: kinship lines are most confidential communication nets

Circles: concentric circles of trusted contacts

Cells: nonhierarchical network with strict compartments

Relays: cross-factional cooperation; requires discreet "hand-off"

<u>Wired in:</u> outside watchdog groups wire warning in; need nexus with local communication networks

Wired out: alarm wired out to trigger prevention or intervention †

Compartmentalization and need-to-know protocols

Various forms of radio

needs to be carefully considered, and plans for mobile or remote broadcasting perhaps prepared.

Civilians need quick verification of micro-level events more than analysis of macro-level trends based on math and computer models. They need ongoing real-time facts about threats and must push that awareness from the edge of their residences as far out as possible.

Outsiders can save lives by listening to civilians, then by sharing advice and experience (often based on lessons learned by *other civilians* in other conflicts.)

Outsiders may help bolster local information strategies and structures—and if deemed risky, STOP THERE, leaving locals to draw their own conclusions and take their own actions.

Chain of reporting that interlaces a safety net with a social web is particularly strong.

Any ICT platform intended to aid local warning (are many now emerging) must be plugged into a willing and organized local response. If it is not, it may be as unhelpful as a blind airdrop onto an unprepared drop zone.

Basic operation

Ways to avoid eavesdropping and jamming

Operation of other telecom platforms, if feasible

Internet, sat phone, mobile phone, Flickr, Twitter, Ushahidi, etc Off-the-grid mobile power sources (hand crank, foot pedal, truck battery pods, electricity kiosks, etc.) for telecom

Low-tech signaling (line-of-sight or range-of-hearing in relays: mirror, shuttered light, flags, fires, whistles, foghorn, burning tires, etc.)

Courier systems

Broken communication: families agree upon a specific newspaper and day of the month in which they can discreetly post their location if they have become hopelessly separated † Alarm wired out may include coordination with external responders (police, army, peacekeepers) that synchronizes first response by locals with follow-on response by outsiders.

Safe sites

Optimal locations; sites often chosen on basis of

Secure ingress and secondary egress

Reasonable access to life-critical sustenance

Optimal site formations

Consolidated: when deterrence and communal action are priority

<u>Dispersed</u>: when low-profile evasion is priority

<u>Networked</u>: when low-profile and occasional communal action are priority

Observation or listening posts (along likely ground or air approaches) Perimeter alert (manned but perhaps enhanced with tripwire alarms);

concentric rings and relays

Simple system of spotters and runners

Dogs for home alert and deterrence; perimeter tracking, etc.

Variable-range patrols (interdiction is an option decided by community)

Blast walls, trenches, pits, tunnels, caves, and bunkers

Improvised secondary/night shelters

Concealment; traceless encampment, crop colors and canopies that are

less noticeable from the air

Avoid creating visible paths to settlement

Avoid being followed to settlement

Discipline with light, cook smoke, and noise (human and animal)

Discreet daily access to foraging, firewood, water, etc.

Conflict early warning \rightarrow response plans [See same heading]

Safe movement

Unplanned flight

Planned flight—triggered by attack and early warning tripwire

Planned flight—preemptive self-displacement, absent a direct attack

Advance relocation of slow-moving elderly or infirm

Optimal travel group size, formation, and composition

Larger if aim is deterrence, smaller if aim is evasion

May include males or armed individuals if aim is deterrence

Route selection

Longer, more difficult route is often chosen

Small party scouting of routes, especially just prior to transit

Many suffer human and material losses in *unplanned* flight—and, if they could "go back in time," would surely plan ahead. This affirms the whole concept of preparedness support.

Planned flight does not denigrate civilians or aid belligerents. It can help civilians retain some control and deny belligerents conscripts and contraband.

Routes used on a frequent basis (commuting to work or sleep locations) are alternated

Cached food and medical supplies en route, insect/pest controls Skills for living off the land (acquiring minimum of food, water, shelter) Stolen or counterfeited forms, cards, and stamps for

False identity that reduces harassment or harm

False "safe passage" documents

Agreed-upon locations to reunite (rally points for individuals, families and subgroups)

Map and grid coordinate reading and other forms of orienteering Off-road travel and night travel

Day travel often includes cash for bribes

Practice traversing difficult terrain

Take advantage of inclement weather to move

Blend in the terrain and avoid being tracked

Noise discipline (silence, hand signals)

Use the escape services of reliable smugglers/traffickers

Landmine clues; retracing steps; marking, warning and informing

Mobile phones to call in support

Recognize layout of ambush and blocking points typical to combatants

Most often, movement through dangerous territory, whether amid evacuation or repatriation, is organized by civilians themselves.

Many choose to stay in place despite great physical risks. The reason is that in flight one can lose many existing securities—and be exposed to new dangers.

Threat response (reaction "on contact"; tactical as opposed to strategic "early warning→response" cited below)

Lightweight evacuation supplies at the ready

Rehearsed response to varied forms of bombardment or incoming fire Automatic sound alarm (megaphone, pyrotechnics, etc.) to disorient,

delay, or deter lightly-armed night raiders

Conflict early warning → response plans [See same heading]

Broken evacuation: fall back dispersal and regrouping plans (down to family level)

Evading infantry sweeps or encirclement

Rapid and semi-rapid hiding practices (nesting in ground cover or climbing trees; building blinds, spider holes, covers, camouflage, etc.)

Delaying, decoying, or diverting hostile pursuit

Recognizing and reacting to ambush sites

Extrication from mined areas

Skill in first aid and simple surgical fixes

Non-formal policing†

(Draws on many of the building block skill sets cited above)

Rudimentary patrolling, surveillence, incident verification, reporting, liaison, on-the-spot mediation, interdiction, etc.

Codes of conduct and accountability cross-checks/balances Sampling of models:

Semi-commercial anti-crime groups, urban and rural work-based security groups

Vigilance groups, informal local government security structures, civil defense forces, ethnic or clan militias, political party militias Analagous examples: unarmed civilian auxiliaries to undergrounds and resistance groups

† Non-formal policing has a long history, elements of which are found in most traditions across the world. Some estimate 80% of security provision in Africa is non-formal. The range of providers & authorizers is broad. Some are law-abiding, some are not. Some are unarmed, some are not. Some partner with formal public safety/security organs, some do not. The violence they contend with ranges from crime to armed conflict. The UNDPKO, UNHCR and aid agencies have fostered local policing groups in many

conflict settings.

OECD and DfID reports advise that careful mapping of such groups and their track records can tell us which ones might be suitably supported. Support from wide swaths of the public itself stems from a given groups' local ownership, accountability, cultural relevance, effectiveness, accessibility, low cost, speed, sustainability, and resilience amid violence.



There exists the potential for non-formal policing groups to "go rogue". Lessons learned in this regard need to be applied.



The ability of such groups must be matched to the threats they are policing against. Outsiders at times think such action entails whistles and wearing tee-shirts; or fences and white flags. In reality, they often need upgraded "police-plus" skills for coping not just with violent crime—but with conflict

Conflict early warning \rightarrow early response

Sampling of purposes:

Warning (*intermediate*) wired to community; facts provide the advance motivation to begin planning contingency responses Warning (*imminent*) wired to community; tripwire triggers set plans to get out of harm's way [see "Safe movement"]

Warning wired to prevention mechanisms that aim to engage civil society, parties to conflict, and "duty bearers"

Warning wired up and out to "rescuers" (such as formal public safety/security organs, peacekeepers, etc.)

Warning wired to armed community or patron [see "Arming"]

Positive conceptual and tactical frameworks for preparedness are found in *early warning doctrine* as well as *disaster risk reduction*. Originating in natural disaster warning and response, much of the reasoning and learning makes sense for conflict risk situations. Note that 3rd and 4th generation conflict early warning as well as DRR are quite locally led.



Conflict prevention has a weak track record. Locals thus need to prepare for a failure to prevent.

Outside duty-bearers or rescuers



have a weak track record, often failing to mount a response. Locals thus need to complement early warning with *their own* contingency responses, at least for a provisional period.

Note: Within the efforts by <u>communities</u> to avoid violence noted above can be nested efforts by or on behalf of at-risk <u>individuals</u> to avoid violence (below).

Skills and tactics by which individuals avoid violence

Women

Discuss locations and situations to avoid

Situational awareness/planned threat response: homes, fields, roads Consolidate housing, within cultural norms and economic dictates (Might deter smaller assaults in which GBV is opportunistic)

Family home extensions or community compounds

Disperse or hide housing, within cultural norms and economic dictates (Might foil larger assaults in which GBV is strategic)

Men take on women's work roles inasmuch as cultural norms and work needs allow

Reduce nonessential movement

Optimal travel group size, formation, and composition [see above] Deterrent escorts while in transit

Optimize or alter resource gathering to lessen exposure to danger

Build water points at closer or more optimal locations

Increase water catchment

Buy firewood; use less wood (cook stoves, food w/ less cook time)

Shift towards livelihoods that lessen exposure to danger

Women's microenterprise mobile telephony doubles as communications net for safety purposes

Change appearance

Dress and walk as a male or an old woman

Cut hair to resemble a male

Hold someone's baby so as to appear not a virgin

Be unattractive—dirty one's face, wear foul-smelling clothes; persuade attacker one is menstruating, has a rash, etc.

Fabricate rumors of rampant STDs

Sexual relationships with male "protectors"; sex for food or favors Stockpile post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits to neutralize HIV infection and pregnancy resulting from rape

Moral authorities persuade perpetrators GBV harms their self interest Discuss dilemmas of sexual violence so as to reduce *secondary assault* visited upon victims: social rejection, economic marginalization, etc.

Discuss any culturally grounded ways to reduce stigma

Prepare local nets to immediately assist victims of sexual violence Prepare community contacts/nets for widows

Women may participate in non-formal policing, support peacekeeper operations, inform the design of camp layout, etc., thereby reducing incidence of gender-based violence

Women may bring unique advantages to navigating tense situations
If hold high status, may have power to compel or shame belligerents
If hold low status, belligerents may underestimate women, giving
them more leeway to undertake protective measures

Women may bring unique advantages to (re)building inter-factional trust

Gender-based violence occurs in differing contexts each of which shape steps for avoidance. GBV tried by a few lightly armed men might be foiled by communal work and housing arrangements. But GBV attempted by larger armed groups opportunistically amid attacks on the community calls for women's precautions nested within larger community preparedness.

Children

Preemptively relocate to safer areas, often with kin

Discuss locations and situations to avoid

Develop situational awareness

Learn the habits of recruiters, traffickers, etc.

Discourage nonessential movement; discuss smart movement

Much is known about the unique vulnerabilities and capacities of women and children in conflict. Their experiences as conscripts, voluntary or not, prove their ability to partake in violence—which in turn prove their tactical ability to prepare for and avoid violence.

School as a safety focal point:

Use safe movement practices in transiting home and school

Teachers impart basic safety messages at school

Waive or subsidize school expenses to keep more children in school and out of danger

Establish alternative sites:

Hide classrooms, buildings of worship, sleeping shelters, etc.

Agree upon what to do and where to meet if separated

Make identification bracelets for infants and children, if advisable

Prepare community contacts/nets to do temporary fostering/adoption

Discuss the purpose of peace operations in the region and of mandates that they may have to protect children

Raise landmine awareness

Discuss dilemmas of abduction

Discuss forced soldiering and killing, mental and spiritual survival, escape, family and community forgiveness, etc.

Those susceptible to armed enlistment /conscription

See section on "Persuade followers to remain nonaligned and peaceful" in regard to mitigating the push and pull drivers behind enlistment

Discuss locations and situations prone to abduction/conscription

Situational awareness/planned threat response: fields, roads, schools, markets, festivals, transportation hubs, sites of worship, etc.

Discreet, dispersed locations for informal schooling

Guardian or safe space arrangements considered for unaccompanied/orphaned children

If duties like travel to market expose men to suspicion, conscription, etc., women may take their place

Men/boys dress as women/girls

Communication net to warn of recruitment sweeps

Identity documents

Having ID might avert bogus detainment and risk of conscription

Having fake ID with understated age might avert conscription

Fein disability; appear unsuitable for conscription

Rapid public response net *might* win release of those just detained / conscripted

Elderly & infirm

Preemptively relocate vulnerable or slow-moving individuals Elders with previous crisis experience advise others on ways of improving safety and attaining life-critical sustenance Older men and women at times hold social stature that enables them to intercede and diffuse violence

Exposed leaders, service providers, activists

Attempt collective or rotating leadership to reduce overexposure Raise profile with media, civil society, INGOs, & foreign governments as deterrent spotlight / accompaniment to raise political price of abuse *Conversely*, keep lower profile

Lay low, blend in

Low-profile operations [see "Life-Critical Services"]

Exposed leaders include those in formal public or institutional structures (elected officials, civil society figures), professionals like doctors, teachers, religious leaders, or others who stand up for their people. Outside support of such dynamic leaders fosters their self-awareness, skills and activism and often contributes to

Standard precautions in negotiation, including advance intelligence, considered tone and tactics, etc.

Seek backing of influential patrons

Safe houses (single or network) and alternate sleeping quarters

Adequate communications at residence

Alternate identity documents

Standard precautions for movement/commuting

Use the escape services of experienced smugglers/traffickers

Proactive information-collection on threats such as arrest warrants, road blocks, death lists, etc.

positive change in society and

Self-awareness and activism can, however, also increase leaders' vulnerability. Engagement means exposure. Outsiders do not often foresee unintended consequences; we seldom help leaders brace for reprisal. Yet with a false sense of security in our presence and imprimatur, they delay preparation for their own survival.



Affinity Groups

Protective social units and networks

Stay together, pull together

Plan for keeping the group intact in the face of pending violence Plan for regrouping if involuntarily separated by violence

Plan for staying linked even while *voluntarily* separated (a very common method of pursuing safety, sustenance, and services)

Plan for safety of exposed leaders who are lynchpins of affinity groups Resist the fear and hate mongering that demagogues use to fabricate new affinity groups based on violence toward others; friends/neighbors across the new communal divide agree to risk sheltering one another Reinforce spiritual strength, solidarity, and dignity

Collaborate for safety

Primordial groups and networks of affinity provide safe refuge when governments, institutions and society are polarized or atomized by mass violence

Collaborate for sustenance

This social architecture undergirds innumerable strategies for obtaining and sharing life-critical sustenance

Collaborate for services

These units and networks are distribution pathways for life-critical services and the primal motivation to serve others regardless of risk

Affinity groups save the lives of millions. They become safer and more effective with increased experience.

Affinity groups are households, social nets, customary subgroups and communities apart from formal state or institutional structures. Such social units and networks are often as important to survival as material resources; often civilians' first asylum, first line of protection.

Many survivors attest that, more than anything else, spiritual strength and sense of solidarity enabled them to endure.

Kin relations and social ties can exclude marginal groups. They may condone discrimination by ethnicity, faith, gender, age, etc.

Such affinity groups may even foster communal violence, a risk that any outside agency must be aware of and avoid.

IDPs forced into cities, urbanites forced into the countryside, and returnees back from long absences often do not benefit from such relations or ties.



Useful ties to patronage powers

Patrons intercede with threatening powers

Church, mosque, monastery, etc. provides buffer

Business sector and threatening powers foster calm for profit's sake

Seek patronage—perhaps for a price

Patron's motives based on social unit or social contract can range from altruistic to paternalistic and calculated. "Benevolence" may be principled or conditional; symbiotic or parasitic.

For civilians who may otherwise

Activate or create these lines of support

Partial list: appeal or censure based on cultural norms of obligation; intermarry into patron lines; curry favor with threatening power, etc.

Seek safety

Patron provides life-saving armed deterrence. The trade-off might be obligation to support the patron's armed activity

Seek sustenance

Patron provides life-critical sustenance to those in need. As in a classic lord-serf relationship, trade-off might be deeper indebtedness

Seek services

Patron provides or pays for life-critical services

face violence alone, a potential patron does not need to be pretty. Patrons can be self-aggrandizing, unelected, autocratic—and can exact a price for their support. It is a calculation that belongs to the civilians themselves.

Proximity to power is inequitable—some in society have more useful ties than others.

Quid pro quo for winning patronage might be too harmful.

Affiliation with the power may change to liability.

Armed Groups

Safety through arms

Note: this document emphasizes alternatives to armed action

Civilians carry personal arms

Civilians lay landmines outside their communities

Communities form self-defense groups †

Civilians or communities gain protection through payment, liaison, or allegiance with an armed group

† Geneva Conventions state "Civil defense organizations have humanitarian tasks... that must be respected and protected. They are intended to protect the civilian population against the dangers of hostilities... and to ensure the conditions necessary for its survival [such as] warning, evacuations, shelters, rescue, public services, etc. ... the carrying of light individual weapons by civilian personnel for the purpose of maintaining order and for selfdefense [is] not considered a harmful act.



Armed activity carries obvious deadly risks.

LIFE-CRITICAL SUSTENANCE ^a

Promote Livelihood

Influence a policy, institution, or process that impacts livelihood potential (A very limited sampling)

Advocate government support for land tenure, food and agricultural subsidies, labor standards, etc.

Organize to protest harmful private banking practices

Create marketing collectives to increase clout and reduce taxes

Draw media and civil society attention to lack of government services and due entitlements

Use traditional mechanisms to resolve dispute over resources

Challenge customs disallowing some groups to accrue wealth or property

Reach accommodation with rival communities in resource disputes

Appeal to authorities about land grabbing

Demand police protect roads and markets

Private sector powers/patrons appeal to militias' self-interest to reduce depredations

Cut deals with threatening powers to remove restrictions on livelihood, especially freedom of movement

Use personal or patronage ties to win exemption from illicit taxation Make deals with middlemen who can assume risks of market activity (i.e. black marketers, or entrepreneurs from a non-persecuted group; can include doing business with the "enemy"- a fairly common type of social "capital" or "bridging")

Policies, institutions, and processes (PIPs) can be a help or a hindrance for civilian efforts to pursue livelihood amid violence. Unresponsive or malevolent PIPs can undercut civilian capacity and exacerbate their vulnerability, limiting the full use of or access to their assets/capital*. And yet, civilians can at times engage those PIPs to promote their livelihoods, even in situations of chronic conflict. † Referring to human, natural, financial, social, and physical capital. To this many add 'political' capital: people's proximity to power and/or their ability to sway those holding power.

Notably, all of the above have less to do with the "technical" aspects of food production or income generation and more to do with influencing actors and events.



Efforts to influence such formal or informal structures and processes do better in more permissive settings. But as law and order decline, such engagement very often proves ineffective or too dangerous.

Conserve and Cushion Assets

Household consumption and expenditure

Adjust to reduced production, income, and market access

Alter consumption

Eat fewer meals, watered-down meals (this might include deliberate unequal impacts per age and gender)

Turn to foods that are more safely attainable or affordable Inventive recipes and processes for food preparation

Greater reliance on foraged foods and medicines

Keep children malnourished to qualify for to feeding programs Reduce expenditure Household adjustments can *delay more dangerous choices*. Those cited here are only a limited sampling.



There are limits to what can squeezed from household-level asset management.

^a This refers not to "barely making a living" but to barely staying alive. Data overwhelmingly shows that during conflict, direct violence is far less of a risk than the indirect effects of violence such as the collapse of *life-critical sustenance* and *services*. Only 0.4% of the millions of deaths across DR Congo from were attributed directly to violence. In conflicts the world over, the majority die **preventable** deaths due to the disruptions caused by violence (which to some extent can be anticipated and **prepared** for). This means millions die away from the shooting.

Buy cheaper items or forgo nonessential purchases

Sell/trade high-value foods for larger quantity of cheaper foods

Send household members to eat elsewhere

Triage spending cuts outside of food security (i.e. education, etc.)

Delay expenditure

Purchase on credit

Reduce investment

Postpone deferrable improvements on real property

Purchase fewer inputs (fertilizer, veterinary care, etc.)

Forgo terracing, weeding, etc. when too dangerous

Other adjustments

Recycle resources of every kind

Seal and store grain for emergency reserve

Conserve water and wood (efficient stoves, food w/ less cook time)

Sell assets for food

Pool assets and spread out risk within affinity groups

Postpone or accelerate marriages depending upon the dowry delayed or accrued; new couples postpone living independently

Attempt to rebuild cushion of production and income

As conditions may allow, attempt typical development activity to help rebuild a life-critical buffer, most especially in terms of food security There are longer-term costs to financial and human capital in some of these measures.

Humanitarians may view cuts and conservation as regressive. Our focus is **forward** on 'post conflict', 'developmental relief' and 'early recovery'. We may be aware that the future might hold more violence, yet still promote development-type activity as being "protective" because it restores production, inventory, and income-thus a "cushion" against more shocks. But amid chronic instability, our efforts to help locals restore livelihoods and assets as they existed prior to conflict might be a *maladapted* response. People may be better served by "conflict-resistant" livelihood strategies and assets—ones that withstand a slide backward.

Adapt and Expand Assets

Adjust income activity

Change time of work

Do more agricultural work at night

Change location of work

Move services from store front to back room

Make sale of wares mobile or discreet

Change currency of work

Move from unstable paper currency to barter items

Subsistence agriculture (and gardening)

Farming and animal husbandry for self-sufficiency, though not necessarily full autarky

Agricultural methods like dibble sticking, hoe farming, slash and burn, shifting cultivation, intensive gardening, etc.

A core strategy for civilians facing civil strife and economic turmoil is to minimize exposure to risks. They very often pursue subsistence agriculture for this reason. Though it provides a lower return, it often entails lower input and lower (economic) risk.

This activity saves the lives of millions. It becomes safer and more effective with increased experience.

Subsistence farming and gardening tend to be more "conflict-resistant" because they do not rely on systems or inputs disrupted by conflict like cash transactions, markets, trucking, storage, fertilizer, veterinary services, and more. Subsistence is also a tactical step: non-market sustenance is acquired at scattered and discreet locations, reducing the incidence of predation.

Foraging

Forage for food items Gathering, hunting, fishing This activity saves the lives of millions. It becomes safer and more effective with increased experience. It is also more

Forage for natural products that are marketable

Salvage foods left in fields, valuables left in conflict zones (may or may not belong to the salvager)

effective when people are still in customary areas about which they are most knowledgeable.

Diversifying or substituting

Rental or day/wage labor arrangements that free one up from ownership

Note: Ownership ties one to a place (like a farm), to a process (like marketing), and to visible assets—all of which are vulnerable amid violence

Livelihood and marketing that entail less exposure to risky travel Shorter harvest cycle crops that improves the chance of getting food out of the ground and sold or cached more quickly

Livestock that is more mobile

Livestock that is hardier; more adapted to ecology where one is fleeing Livestock that is less 'unappealing' to looters

New seed stocks adapted to ecology where one is fleeing

Inventive blacksmithing to replace looted or abandoned implements

Service skills, especially those meeting needs actually spurred by conflict, that pose a portable and profitable interim livelihood

Remote and diverse locales, new caching techniques, livestock holdings that are more difficult targets, alternate grazing routes and locales

Civilians often seek livelihood alternatives that meet their bare needs and also are less exposed or tempting (to predators), are elusive or quickly mobile, are well-adapted to new conditions, and may capitalize on economic needs generated by conflict.

Emergency movement

Shorter-term commuting

The "commute" may be predicated upon safety in a shadow settlement or aid camp at night and movement to work sites by day. The commute may be daily or much less frequent, as dictated by agricultural cycle and safety concerns

Deliberate flight / evacuation / displacement

These activities save the lives of millions. They become safer and more effective with increased experience.

Emergency separation

Able-bodied family members leave the home area to pursue earnings that can be sent back to the family

Able-bodied family members stay behind and continue working and watching the family's assets, while the other members are sent to safer or better-provisioned locales

Social networks

Social norms and structures of:

Shared resources

Shared financial risk

Collective laboring

Hosting traditions

Kinship exchange / reciprocity processes

Indigenous social welfare mechanisms [for more "institutional" mechanisms see section on "Life-Critical Services"]

These networks save the lives of millions and become more effective with increased experience.



These networks become exhausted under prolonged stress, especially without advance planning.

Patronage networks

Patron provides or intercedes or enables access to life-critical sustenance Religious entities provide succor or exert moral authority upon power-holders to do so

Business leaders try to keep workforce and market functions intact Political leaders (whether elected to state-based jurisdictions or

These networks, generally nonformal/non-state, save a great many lives.

Proximity to power is not equitable—some in society have more useful ties than

possessing authority conferred by social standing, social contract, or social unit) alter/substitute policies, institutions, and processes to improve civilians' life-critical sustenance

Armed entities (whether government line ministries or the relief

Armed entities (whether government line ministries or the relief wings of non-state armed groups) secure civilians' livelihood access and/or provide succor

others. Moreover, patronage sometimes comes with a price. The quid pro quo for winning patronage might become as harmful (indebtedness to economic elites, guilt by political association, reciprocal armed conscription) as the benefits bestowed.

Money networks

Personal borrowing

Commercial borrowing (banks, merchants)

Locally pooled money for conflict-induced emergencies Remittances

Remittance systems are protected against disruption by

Identifying fallback cash transfer agents

Planning alternate carrier/courier systems

Rebuild communications, as in mobile phone systems

Identifying default remittance destinations

Keeping necessary documents

Finding proxies to do transactions

These activities save the lives of millions. They become safer and more effective with increased experience.

Remittances exceed all private flows of investment and official development assistance and are countercyclical in that diasporas give more just when aid agencies, donors, and investors withdraw due to imminent crisis.



Borrowing may be a maladapted response if it leads to harmful indebtedness.

External relief

[For locally led relief, see section "Life-Critical Services"]

This activity saves the lives of millions—when civilians can access it. Sometimes they must first survive alone for months or years and then run a deadly gauntlet to reach foreign aid.

External relief becomes a maladapted response if it leads to debilitating dependency.



Foreign relief operations frequently shut down in the face of danger when they are most needed.

Pay offs

Pay fees, fines, taxes, or bribes in order to pursue livelihood activities unmolested

Buying off local enforcers assures the survival of many.

Buying off local enforcers can leech war mobilization policy. Strategies to strip civilian assets (food, labor, supply) are sapped when, for a bribe, soldiers or political cadres *do not* enforce demands for contraband and conscripts. This means less fuel for conflict.

Another view holds that pay offs can reinforce the violence and corruption afflicting a society. This would hold true when extortion benefits a violent spoiler as opposed to a simple unpaid soldier.

Shadow & Coping economies

All the above arguably are actions in the coping economy. More are cited

below. There are many ways to frame this. Wartime economies operate at varied connected levels with varied but overlapping actors. The tipping point between licit and illicit, or sustainable and unsustainable, is often unclear. Never—even in a failed state—has everything failed. Economic functions get reinvented; every need gets commoditized. Some profit while others more downstream stay barefoot—but alive. As used here, "petty" means subsistence level and "larger-scale" refers to something more syndicated and profitable.

Marginal production: crafts, bricks, charcoal, etc. ⇒ grain alcohol

Registration for relief aid ⇒ multiple (bogus) registrations

Consumption of relief aid \Rightarrow unauthorized sale of relief aid

Petty, small-scale resource extraction ⇒ larger-scale resource extraction

Petty, small-scale smuggling ⇒ larger-scale smuggling

Petty trade in undeclared (cross-border) goods ⇒ larger-scale trade

Hoarding ⇒ price speculation and rate gouging

Petty corruption ⇒ larger-scale corruption

Begging

⇒ Prostitution; exposure to STDs/AIDS

⇒ Cultivation of outlawed products (poppy, etc.)

⇒ Drug dealing

Violent exploitation

⇒ Protection rackets

⇒ Armed checkpoint taxation

⇒ Compulsory labor

These activities save the lives of millions. They become safer and more effective with increased experience.

Wartime economy experts often stress that distinctions should be made between those who violently profit from conflict and those trying to survive amid it. This distinction is rarely found in the aid community which takes a rather "hands off" view of the shadow and coping economies. But as Fred Cuny noted, "In many situations, understanding and manipulating market forces can be far more important and effective than classic relief operations."

Some of these actions are illicit or innately harmful to oneself or others, others can become maladapted to the point of harm. They are indicated by "⇒" here.

Remote & cross-border markets

Organize jungle or bush markets or trading sites Negotiate discreet cross-line markets with adversaries Commute cross border to safe markets

Strip and Transfer Assets b

Redeeming

Collect debts or rent due

Withdraw savings, loans, or shares locked up in an enterprise

Anything withdrawn/divested can later be re-deposited and reinvested.



Unless done carefully, such action can affect the solvency of institutions and stir panic.

Caching

Food surpluses (esp. salted, smoked, or dried foods), medicines, shelter sheeting, seed stock, portable livelihood tools, cash, documents, and valuables hidden near probable flight routes and rally points Practices of camouflaging caches and controlling for insect/pest damage

b Today's "emergency livelihoods" discourse stresses that overt ownership of assets can *increase* one's vulnerability. Thus in many "conflicts" (often better described as asset-stripping enterprises), civilians try to strip first, converting or transferring their assets. Affinity groups usually serve as "first responders" amid crises. Transferring assets to this support network has multiple benefits. First, it protects family wealth. Second, it removes resources that actually invite attack and harm. Third, it keeps that wealth out of the hands of criminals and belligerents, giving less encouragement and strength to their asset stripping; less fuel for the fire. Fourth, it puts those resources into the hands of trusted first responders, strengthening that network. This is vital because such nets often become exhausted, thus requiring displaced persons to make dangerous secondary and tertiary flights.

Liquidating

Assets are converted into portable or concealable currency such as small amounts of gold, silver, or jewelry

Assets are converted (whether sold, pawned, or put up as collateral) for cash that is mailed, wired, or electronically transferred to safe repositories or to first responders in one's affinity network

Amid violence, physical assets can be a liability. So too, *in countless ways survival can be bought*. Liquidating assets is thus an extremely common tactic. Indeed, civilians often liquidate the commodities that aid agencies give them for the sake of safety, mobility, and discretionary pay-offs.



The predatory instincts of buyers can be aroused by "distress sales" (a hallmark of forced removal) resulting in prices depressed by having a lot of the same kinds of possessions and properties on the market at the same time.

Dismantling

Strip, bury, or sell roofing and other building materials

Civilians often save such material for reuse and avoid a future rebuilding expense.

Transferring

Transfer portable possession to safer locations Plan ahead for affordable transport of the above possessions

Temporary guardianship

Leave possessions in the care of trusted parties who are less likely to be looted or displaced

Leave fixed properties and land in the custody of trusted parties who may be able to provide nominal maintenance and oversight against squatters, looters, etc.

Temporary forfeiting

In anticipation of needing to flee, civilians secure any documentation (titles, deeds, birth certificates, identity cards, etc.) that will later help them reclaim their land or fixed properties

In conflicts around the globe civilians cede their land and fixed properties with every intention of reacquiring them someday. Cases of ethnic cleansing that forever change the demography of land ownership are rare. More common challenges for a returnee are squatters or confused title status due to oral agreements, challenges in claiming inheritance, or other problems that could have been anticipated.

Scorching

Dissuade belligerents, violent marauders, or squatters by damaging or destroying one's own property. This is done after:

a feasible level of stripping, dismantling, and salvaging, and alternate arrangements for safety, sustenance, and shelter Dissuade belligerents, violent marauders, or squatters by creating the impression that property is *uninhabitable*. This might be done by

Civilians who perceive that their properties are drawing violence closer to them will at times destroy them. The fact (or the appearance) of having already been burned out and looted sometimes prevents deeper harm to life and livelihood.

fabricating:

bogus landmine markers (known only to the community), the illusion of poisoned wells or water points, rumors of curses (potent in many places) or diseases, the fiction of armed backers, etc

Destruction of key assets and voluntary displacement carry clear challenges and risks.

LIFE-CRITICAL SERVICES ^c

Conventional-profile Service Delivery

Conventional engagement to maintain or win access

Negotiate, advocate, attempt media pressure to win consent for work

Tap protective social units and networks

Tap ties to threatening powers

Make tolerable pay-offs



These strategies, though often successful, have their limits.

Conventional staff security

Acceptance

Protection

Deterrence



Local providers of relief or welfare services have often survived due to these strategies.

Yet this "security triangle" of strategies frequently fails to safeguard them. Though outside agencies often assume otherwise, local providers are guaranteed neither local acceptance nor enhanced protection because of their ties and knowledge. Being local can even create risks.

Low-profile Service Delivery

When conventional service delivery becomes too dangerous, local providers sometimes adopt tactics of anonymity and avoidance in order to continue helping their people. Sometimes, as our local staff or partners, they even do this with our support when we are forced to pull out and work through them remotely. Locally led low profile service delivery has won praise in several settings. The challenges it faces stem not from the strategy per se, but from the tactics chosen. Such work can be safer and more efficient; such operations can have both a low profile and popular acceptance.

These activities save the lives of millions. They become safer and more effective with increased experience.

Foreign agencies outsource risky work to local staff or partners via "remote management". Tactics for low-profile service delivery such as cited here can help that work become safer.

Clearly, low-profile work can be labeled subversive, and local providers do often try to assure their security by being wholly transparent with and subordinate to parties in a conflict. This document deals instead with those times when openness will either get them killed or end any meaningful aid. In such situations, they must be able to survive violence before they can serve amid it.



^c This refers to services addressing killers like disease and malnutrition. Data overwhelmingly shows that during conflict, direct violence is far less of a risk than the indirect effects of violence such as the collapse of *life-critical sustenance* and *services*. Only 0.4% of the millions of deaths across DR Congo from were attributed directly to violence. In conflicts the world over, the majority die **preventable** deaths due to the disruptions caused by violence (which to some extent can be anticipated and **prepared** for). This means millions die away from the shooting.

Information

Information gathering

Awareness of *priority* threat indicators

Shifts in military behavior—changes in command, strength, and morale; alterations in patrol; movement of fresh equipment and supply; unusual intelligence activity; increases in garrison size, upgrading of roads or extension of outposts; laying more mines, etc. Shifts in political behavior—many indicators, but most often: rise of powers with dangerous backgrounds, passage of restrictive laws, vilification of supposed "enemies", clamp down on media and civil society, etc.

Shifts in treatment of aid workers—increased surveillance or harassment of service delivery, changes in the application or interpretation of law as it affects such work

Discreet word-of-mouth networks

Social units and networks

Paid informants

Close coordination with trusted influentials among the populace on security updates, needs assessments, details of upcoming distributions or services, monitoring and evaluation

Commercially available radio scanners

Public domain satellite imagery (like Google Earth) confirm damage to Infrastructure, aid route planning, etc.

Discreet observation

Foster constant situational awareness in every worker

Information assessment (and 'actionability')

Cross-verify reports from varied sources

Access first-hand accounts deemed reliable from conflict areas Access sources of news deemed reliable for interpretation of events *Anticipate* the scenario(s) which an assessment might yield; *proactively* consider and build staff consensus for actionable response(s) even before a critical threshold is crossed

Information protection

Compartmentalization

Need-to-know protocols; physical separation of certain information, operations and staff

Be aware of surveillance; take steps to co-opt or avoid it

Document safety

Burn rubbish; have most sensitive exchanges in person rather than on paper; minimize paper trails on projects, purchases, etc., watch for signs of illicit entry or tampering at offices; computers under lock and key; password access; files encrypted, file backups stored off-site; removable media; clean disk security; anti-virus and firewall software; etc.

Safeguard identities of staff and beneficiaries

Confidentiality:

for work with victims of abuse and sources of sensitive information

As Macrae and Leader say, accurate information on conflict is "a precondition for effective and principled humanitarian action." ⁴

Safeguarding information is especially important in aid agencies that politically sensitive activity such as human rights, civil society, good governance, rule of law, ending impunity, and social justice.

Mary Anderson notes "strategies for delivering aid secretly thwart thieves' need for knowledge." ⁵

Phillipe Le Billon adds "keeping the time and location of delivery secret can reduce opportunity for looting. Risks can be displaced by publicly announcing a food convoy in a different location." ⁶

Cover stories

Avoid infiltration

Be aware of predatory efforts to learn/abuse operational details, or political efforts to discredit the organization

Do more detailed vetting of possible new hires

If apolitical informants act due to intimidation or desperate need, consider if the threats they face can be lowered

Base hiring decisions partly on affinity ties—family, tribal, party or other connections—while retaining checks on abuse

Disinformation

Distributions or services onto a mobile or irregular or unannounced basis with advance notice limited to the parties needed to assure its effectiveness

Manipulate information such as planting errant reports, fake rumors, forged documents, maps with misleading marks, or phony radio orders

Communication

A layered mix of low-to-high tech communications, as appropriate Prioritize equipment that is suitable for a discreet and mobile workplace and train on it far enough in advance

Simple sources of power off the electrical grid

Need-to-know only protocols

Keep communications undetected, undeciphered, or deniable

Flat, cell-based contact networks apt for a discrete and dispersed workplace

The most effective networks are often built on groups of affinity

Safe movement

Replace recognizable vehicles with private or commercial transport and alternate the chosen transport

Replace vehicles with pack animals for off-track travel

Route selection

Longer, more difficult route is often chosen

Routes used on a frequent basis (workers' commute, delivery routes) are alternated

Small party scouting of routes, especially just prior to transit Cache supplies closer to intended distribution or service sites so that transit to these sites is less of a logistical or security challenge Master off-road travel and night travel

Includes traversing difficult terrain; taking advantage of inclement weather to move

Take full advantage of surprise and *initiative*; of choosing when, where, and how to move and keeping dangerous groups off-balance Use multi-faction networks "to orchestrate *relays* where goods, equipment, sensitive information, cash or medical cases are handed off from one cell or staff member to another... so as to get safely from one place to another." ⁷ This enables service "reach" across a landscape of patchwork loyalties.

Mobile phones to call in support

Threat response

Automatic response to varied forms of bombardment or incoming fire Skill in first aid and simple surgical fixes

Threats at a "workplace"

"Workplace" can be downsized and a workforce dispersed. Response thus may focus more on evasive measures for individuals than on evacuation plans for entire organizations [see "Deconstruction"] Fallback plans for when a portion of operating network is compromised Lightweight evacuation supplies at the ready

Protocols for destroying records, moving or disabling equipment, etc Anticipate confiscation of financial assets—have back up plans ready

Threats during movement (beyond the Safe movement options cited above)

Recognizing and reacting to ambush sites

Recognizing and reacting to mined areas

Evasive driving techniques

Delaying, decoying, or diverting hostile pursuit

Threats on contact with aid recipients

Build strong coordination with trusted influentials in the populace Such coordination does not require public visibility Select location least likely to draw unwanted attention Select commodities least likely to draw unwanted attention



Classic "truck and chuck" forays can risk unsafe, inefficient, inequitable distribution of aid. The ground should be better prepared for such hit and run aid.

Deconstruction (Safe sites)

Downgrade identity

Stop branding; furl flags and remove magnetic sign logos when wise Ditch or falsify identification

Obscure agency's paper (and funding) trail

Have media outreach, but operations leave no footprint

Through intermediary, inform belligerents of general mission, so as to convey respect and avert misjudgments about the mission

Reveal agency's identity only at distribution or service times

Give all credit for their work to "more acceptable" partners

Discreetly co-locate with another, more accepted entity

Work under pseudonyms or take on the appearance of a different type of organization

"Partial disclosure" of their work to trusted, influential actors only Go into periods of "hibernation"

Publicly close an agency then quietly reconstitute it with no legal personality or authorization

Publicly conduct programs that belligerents will tolerate, while privately aiding groups most at risk

All of these tactics of selective transparency have been used in Iraq—some by UN and major aid agencies through their local proxies

We often equate presence with "visibility", and transparency with "acceptability". But there are many shades between visible and invisible, thus more choices than these false dichotomies would imply. Also, historical analogies show overwhelmingly that overt visibility is not needed by a movement to ensure its acceptance from and coordination with a population

Downsize infrastructure

Shift from offices to homes; from warehouses to innocuous buildings The main attraction and objective of attacks on aid Rotate "office" locations often is its *properties* not its personnel. The prime targets Use portable gear for computing (laptops?) and communications (sat-phones?) are offices, motor pools and warehouses. Fortunately, Conversely, adopt/adapt simpler, cheaper technologies these features of our aid Replace expensive standing motor pool with an assemblage of porters. "footprint" can be downsized, pack animals, carts, or contracted or private motor vehicles to provide dispersed, or done away with. ad-hoc transport that can get a distribution done and then melt away Careful protocols make cash a Disperse, monetize, or outsource supplies more elusive target than Cache equipment and supplies commodities. Practice shows Scatter warehouses cash is used wisely by recipients and can stimulate Aim for last minute local acquisition and quick distribution so that local markets supplies do not sit for long Voucher, coupon, and Break large distributions into smaller ones outsourcing arrangements with Use cash transfers, commodity coupons, or promissory note systems in merchants reduce aid's logistical tail and turn shops lieu of commodities into "aid warehouses". To the Monetize commodities with merchants extent that practices are privatized and localized, aid Outsource supply distribution operations may become more conflict resistant In Iraq "a wide range of Disperse staff [service providers employ an] Small groups independently work and resources themselves—but also in-house network of cells or converge for scaled up joint action individuals that work independently when staff Need-to-know protocols might have staff aware of the identities of only mobility is poor, but a limited number of colleagues interdependently when it improves" ⁸ Moreover, the Prepare staff mentally for arrest, imprisonment, and physical abuse collapse of one cell does not compromise the whole network. Staff dispersal is not just a matter of physical geography but social geography as well; not just an issue of their safety but also of leveraging the trust they exercise within varied segments of the populace. This refers again to networks of affinity. Trust is the password to access, especially in conflicts that are communally, militarily, or geographically fragmented. i.e. Both WFP and CARE Disperse beneficiaries have decentralized operations Discourage consolidation of beneficiary populations, especially if it has when the threats of attack and not yet occurred and is not absolutely warranted for safety purposes looting existed, dispersing beneficiaries, convoys, and distribution areas. Experience shows dispersion of beneficiaries can at times be managed and sustained, as it promotes more local integration and selfsufficiency. Efforts toward autonomy create wise economies that may offset whatever is lost in classic

camp "economy of scale"

Delegate work

Identify entities that might be in a stronger position to do service delivery and seek a partnership or transfer of responsibility. In past conflicts, the more capable entity often proved to be

mosques, in Iraq clan-based networks, in Somalia private contractors, in Uganda

civil society groups, in the Philippines

community-based organizations, in El Salvador

welfare wings of a reliable armed party in Eritrea and Burma

Service providers in the mold of an "aid" or "welfare" agency need to know their limits—and the relative strengths of other possible vehicles for service delivery.

Community Substitute Action

Health action

Nutrition and food security

See section on "Life-critical sustenance"

Physical health

Hidden clinics and pharmacies

Black market and smuggled medicines

Traditional medicines, prophylaxes, etc.

Traditional healers and cures

Vast number of basic preventive health messages disseminated by local health volunteers

Mental health

Socially and spiritually-based coping mechanisms for psychosocial trauma, community reintegration, etc.

Community contacts/nets to do temporary fostering/adoption

Community effort to reduce secondary effects of sexual violence visited upon victims: social rejection, economic marginalization, etc.

Culturally grounded ways to reduce stigma

Local nets to immediately assist victims of sexual violence

Community contacts/nets for widows

Religious, cultural, recreational, or educational activities to reduce feelings of stress and isolation, and reinforce feelings of continuity and hope Symbolic acts of resistance to reaffirm dignity and identity

Self-policing of alcohol/drug consumption, domestic violence, anti-social or criminal behavior

Radios (hand-crank or other appropriate-tech) to entertain and break sense of isolation

Amid violence, families and communities usually pursue remedies for the dire threats of malnutrition and disease. Our local aid counterparts cannot always extend substantial resources—but may be able to support informal community action in these sectors.

No discussion of civilian survival can be limited to material inputs and conscious strategies. There are always other ethereal forces at work. A sense of hope can be what ultimately governs whether endangered civilians pull together or pull apart. Hope forms within and between individuals. It comes when people realize they have the ability to resist and prevail over terrible assaults on their identity, dignity, and their very lives. Hope can be the invisible but essential ingredient of mental health.

Water and sanitation action

Traditional water development

shallow wells, catchment, dams

Basic preventive health messages (avoid transmission of sickness, maintain hygiene, boil water, make soap, etc.) disseminated by local health volunteers

ENDNOTES

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